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Book Reviews
Biography
A Spy Named Orphan: The Enigma of Donald Maclean
By Roland Philipps
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

R

oland Philipps has produced an interesting and valuable biography
of former British diplomat Donald Maclean, who conducted
significant Soviet-sponsored espionage activities for decades as part
of the “Cambridge Five” spy ring. This group was composed of five
committed upper-class British communists, who after their studies and
radicalization at Cambridge University, falsely claimed to have renounced
their radical pasts. They then established themselves in important careers,
where they acted as Soviet agents and did substantial damage to Western
security interests before and during the Cold War. All of these men had
developed a rigidly Marxist outlook in the 1930s during a period of
political turmoil and economic depression throughout the world.
Philipps suggests certain elements of Maclean’s upbringing under
the supervision of a strict and morally uncompromising father played
out in unexpected ways. At Cambridge Maclean began searching for
a cause and an opportunity to serve humanity. In an era of moral and
political uncertainty, he felt he was beginning to find that opportunity
by studying Marxism. He did so at a time when communism had become
more acceptable at British universities due to the Great Depression,
mass unemployment, reduced wages, and rapidly expanding and visible
poverty throughout the United Kingdom and other Western societies.
The widely accepted and very rosy predictions of continued growth in
the Western economies following World War I dissolved in the aftermath
of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. These economic problems were further
complicated by the frightening rise of fascism in Europe.
In this atmosphere, young Maclean joined the popular Cambridge
University Socialist Society, where about a quarter of the participants
were also members of the Communist Party. Maclean was a vocal
supporter of many radical causes and even identified himself as a
Communist in an interview with the student newspaper. He graduated
from Cambridge in June 1934 as the same morally rigid person he had
always been, but this rigidity was now in the service of his belief in the
need for world revolution. Moreover, Maclean’s communism was not
that of a leftist academic drawing diagrams of class struggle; he was a
hard-core Communist who saw the Soviet Union as the epitome of what
he believed the world should be.
After graduating from Cambridge Maclean applied to the Foreign
Office and sought a career in diplomacy. It was at least possible, and
probably likely, that he was planning to work on behalf of the Soviet
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Union even at this early stage in his life. He did well in his Foreign
Office examinations and during the interview phase dismissed his radical
past as a brief flirtation with an ideology, which he by then viewed as
nonsense. Such an explanation appealed to his examiners who shared
a widespread British upper-class view that interest in socialism or even
communism was simply a “passing fancy of youth” (50). Undoubtedly, it
was such a “fancy” with some candidates, but not in this case. Maclean’s
examiners, correspondingly, made their country vulnerable by refusing
to entertain the possibility that someone of his family, background, and
upbringing could be committed to anything but establishment values.
No serious investigation occurred into Maclean’s life experiences, and
he was inducted into the Foreign Office as a junior official.
Perhaps even more egregious, and indicative of the same approach,
Maclean’s friend, Kim Philby, was eventually inducted into the British
Intelligence Service despite his own youthful record of radical activism
and his secret marriage to an Austrian communist, who recruited him
into Soviet service. Philby used his communist connections in Europe
and put Maclean in touch with a Soviet handler, who quickly recruited
Maclean to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and its
satellite organization, the Communist International (Comintern).
Philipps shows that Maclean was a brilliant and extremely productive
Soviet agent throughout most of his diplomatic career. In some ways the
British government made it easy for him. The Foreign Office showed
almost no serious interest in document control for classified material,
and Maclean freely took important secret documents home with him.
This practice was well-known among his coworkers, but they wrote it off
as a by-product of Maclean’s exceptionally strong work ethic. While he
did work on these documents at home, Maclean usually had his Soviet
handler photograph them first.
Philipps maintains Maclean conserved his self-esteem throughout
most of his diplomatic career by his service to the communist cause.
Maclean would become unhappy and depressed during periods when
he was unable to obtain especially important documents for Moscow.
He also married an American radical, and against the principles of
intelligence tradecraft, he told her he was working as a spy for the Soviet
Union. During his time as a Soviet agent Maclean seemed impervious
to doubt about the Soviet system under Stalin. While some supporters
of the Soviet Union were shaken by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet
invasion of Finland, and the Great Purges, Maclean remained sanguine,
trusting in Stalin’s judgment, and a total ideologue.
As the world situation became more alarming, Maclean’s career with
the Foreign Office continued to flourish, and he achieved important
promotions due to his intellect, hard work, and apparent commitment
to the job. He did, nevertheless, feel considerable pressure from living
a double life and began drinking heavily, eventually becoming an
alcoholic who was often loud, unpleasant, and sometimes violent when
drunk. These clear warning signs eventually earned him a lengthy
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period of leave to rest, but never caused a review of his fitness to hold a
security clearance.
Yet, if British counterintelligence efforts were naive regarding
Maclean, Soviet intelligence activities as Philipps shows were often
stumbling and unprofessional. The Soviets initially gave Maclean the
code name Orphan, which reflected his fatherless state at the time and
his solitary nature. This misguided approach represented the weak Soviet
tradecraft in the 1930s and 1940s. Code names sometimes reflected
personal attributes of the individual in question and were therefore less
effective than a random name in protecting their agent’s identity if the
code name was compromised. In an even more unforgivable example of
this failing, Maclean’s fellow Cambridge spy Anthony Blunt was given
the code name Tony.
These mistakes were marginal compared to those brought on by
the paranoia infecting the Stalinist system. Soviet handlers were often
recalled to Moscow on the assumption they might have become too
westernized during their time abroad regardless of their outward loyalty.
They usually willingly returned as ordered, facing almost certain death
after extensive torture. Ironically, the Soviets often suspected Maclean
of being a double agent due to the same prejudices as the British, a
general disbelief that an upper-class British civil servant would actually
be willing to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Yet, the
material he provided to the Soviets was so useful they found it difficult
to write him off.
As with many Soviet agents, Maclean worried about his identity being
properly protected by Moscow. General Walter Krivitsky defected from
Soviet intelligence in 1937 and represented a potential threat to all Soviet
spies in the British government, depending upon what information he
knew to pass along to British counterintelligence officers. Unfortunately,
this information was fairly limited. Krivitsky told his debriefers there
were two Foreign Office spies, but he did not provide details to suggest
who the traitors were. Moreover, Krivitsky’s usefulness to Western
intelligence came to an end when he was murdered by Soviet agents in
Washington, DC, in 1941.
Maclean avoided detection in this instance but was much more
seriously implicated by US intelligence personnel who decrypted
important portions of various intercepted messages. Many of these
messages were decoded because of Soviet shortcuts for encryption taken
during and after World War II. Tipped off by Philby in Washington, DC,
about the American decryptions, Maclean fled to Moscow with fellow
Cambridge Five spy Guy Burgess. Together the men lost the surveillance
placed on them and managed to reach France and then Switzerland
before disappearing into the Soviet Union in 1951.
Moscow initially refused to acknowledge Maclean’s presence, but
then allowed him to assume a more public role. He learned Russian,
acquired a doctorate, and became a senior analyst for the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations. Maclean’s wife and three
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children joined him in Moscow, although the marriage remained under
great strain due in part to his severe alcoholism.
Perhaps the most important lesson of A Spy Named Orphan is that
loyalty cannot be taken for granted because of a person’s background,
education, or apparent conformism to social and organizational values.
Another lesson is the tremendous damage a single well-placed agent can
do if left in place without any investigation of scandalous statements or
behavior. None of these lessons will come as a surprise to intelligence
officials, but a comprehensive analysis of old lessons provided by a
case study such as this work can be useful. It may also convey valuable
knowledge for military leaders who are not intelligence professionals but
who sometimes work in classified environments.

How Ike Led: The Principles Behind
Eisenhower’s Biggest Decisions
By Susan Eisenhower
Reviewed by Dr. Jonathan D. Arnett, research director at the Modern War
Institute at the United States Military Academy

New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2020
400 pages
$14.99

H

ow Ike Led is a readable whirlwind tour of the life and leadership
of Dwight D. Eisenhower, written by his granddaughter, Susan
Eisenhower—a longtime policy strategist and author of the 1996 book
Mrs. Ike: Memories and Reflections on the Life of Mamie Eisenhower. I highly
recommend the book to readers with limited time who want to know
more quickly about the general and the 34th president. Ms. Eisenhower
indicates the book is a primer on Ike, a reintroduction of Dwight
Eisenhower to the public, for those who did not grow up during his
lifetime or who know little of him. Ms. Eisenhower relies on information
garnered from scholarly works and her grandfather’s contemporaries and
subordinates and intersperses childhood memories of her grandfather
throughout the book—which I found interesting and very touching.
The book does not offer anything particularly new historically.
Instead, Ms. Eisenhower condenses Ike’s history and highlights his
critical decisions and character traits in a very personal, intimate way as
only a granddaughter can do. As Ike’s granddaughter, Ms. Eisenhower
illustrates more clearly and personally, the character and leadership
principles that governed Ike’s success as a commander and president.
She admits the book’s genesis, partially, was a reaction to 30 years of
sharp criticism of the Eisenhower administration. She also claims as
she grew older and dealt with more policy issues herself, she became
more impressed with her grandfather’s legacy and appreciated how well
he handled the challenging problems of the early Cold War. She claims
criticism of Ike’s presidency has waned, and Americans increasingly are
gaining an appreciation for her grandfather’s wisdom and bipartisanship.
She hopes this book maintains that momentum.
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I will not detail all of Ike’s big decisions and specific character traits
highlighted in the book but will focus on a few. First, having worked
closely for a service secretary and chief of staff, as well as three fourstar combatant commanders, and supported high-stakes war planning,
I have a special appreciation for Eisenhower’s strengths as a staffer,
commander, and president. He had excellent judgment and seemed
intuitively able to balance desired ends with available means against
risks and prevail. In today’s lexicon of buzzwords and catchphrases, Ike
was an exemplary “critical thinker.” While Ike may have made errors
along the way—and what leaders do not—he consistently made the right
calls when the stakes were highest. There were no great tragedies or
catastrophes on his watch, and his record says a lot.
Second and directly related to his judgment, Ike vehemently
believed in personal responsibility and accountability. Ms. Eisenhower
retells the story of the famous note Ike crafted in case the Normandy
invasion failed, where he accepted full responsibility for the decision
and results. She also concisely retells the U-2 shoot down, and how Ike
accepted responsibility for the embarrassment. I was also impressed
with how Eisenhower dealt with a very subtle compromise of Operation
Overlord planning. Close to D-Day, one of Ike’s senior officers hinted
to a woman he desired to impress that he would be in France by midJune. Eisenhower immediately relieved the officer. In an age when
compromising legitimately protected state secrets has become sport, I
admire Ike’s swift, resolute action. Regarding his integrity and objectivity,
Ms. Eisenhower notes President Eisenhower repeatedly stated during
his presidency that there would be no favoritism or nepotism, and
reportedly, the majority of his advisers, staffers, and appointees were
professionals rather than amateur or career politicians.
Third, without using the term, Ms. Eisenhower also highlights Ike’s
profound stoicism. Ike believed some personal battles, some trials of
mind and heart, should be fought privately. This belief was old school
self-help, which is alien in a contemporary culture where leaders and
celebrities relish publicly broadcasting all their fears, disabilities, and
foibles. Across his youth, West Point years, and Army career, Ike learned
to control himself—his passions, his anger, his selfishness. His stoicism
became part and parcel of his exceptionalism.
It is a pity that in contemporary vernacular, the title Boy Scout has
acquired an almost negative connotation denoting a person who is naïve
or foolishly virtuous. The character traits Ms. Eisenhower highlights
in her grandfather are those of the ideal Scout and are embodied in the
Scout Law—“A Scout is: Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly” (US
Boy Scouts, “Scout Law”). Reading about Ike’s humble beginnings,
religious upbringing, and close-knit family reminded me of a famous
old quote of our national character being great because it was good. Ike
was great because he was good, with good judgment and core attributes
from which his leadership flowed.
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At the beginning and ending of the book, Ms. Eisenhower appears
to have another subtle objective in mind in addition to creating a
superb primer on General and President Eisenhower. She engages in
very mild sociopolitical commentary. Essentially, she critiques a culture
and political class that is transfixed by the moment and buffeted by
the present with very little deep deliberation for the long-term—the
strategic—what is good collectively for the entire country. Like my
parents, she waxes nostalgic for a previous period in US history—the
era of her youth, the era when her grandfather was president. She misses
the values and principles that caused a generally united, albeit imperfect
nation, to “Like Ike.”

George W. Goethals and the Army: Change and
Continuity in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era
By Rory McGovern
Reviewed by Dr. John K. Hawley, engineering psychologist,
US Army Futures Command

Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2019
328 pages
$34.95

R

ory McGovern’s biography of George W. Goethals is a wellresearched account of an important military officer and his career
during the historical periods referred to as the Gilded Age and the
Progressive Era, roughly 1880 to 1920. Goethals managed two significant
efforts during this period—the construction of the Panama Canal and the
reorganization of the Army’s World War I logistics enterprise. McGovern
addresses the changes forced upon the Army by the rise of the United
States as an international power following the Spanish-American War
and uses Goethals’s career as a lens through which to examine the Army’s
response to change during that period.
Goethals entered West Point in 1876 when the academy was less
an educational institution than a mechanism for military acculturation.
The prevailing view at the time was that the best form of education was
experiential. Beyond West Point, there was little opportunity to receive
what is now known as professional military education. This view was less
true for the Army Corps of Engineers, of which Goethals became a part.
Engineering was emerging as a professional discipline, but professional
military education was still mostly experiential. Goethals, however, was
fortunate. His early assignments led to his development as a competent
civil engineer. McGovern notes Goethals’s career progression was more
a matter of good fortune than anything done systematically by the Army
to foster his professional development.
Goethals’s success across his early assignments eventually brought
him into contact with W. H. Taft, then Secretary of War. About the same
time, the United States had committed to the construction of the Panama
Canal. For a variety of reasons, building the canal was a troubled project.
US President Teddy Roosevelt wanted a construction manager who
would not quit when the going got tough. That requirement suggested a
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military officer. Roosevelt consulted Taft who suggested Goethals, and
Roosevelt concurred. Acting through Goethals, the Army took charge
of canal construction in 1907. Roosevelt’s directive to Goethals was to
“make the dirt fly,” and he did (96). The canal opened for traffic on
August 15, 1914.
Completing the canal was a “feather in the Army’s cap” and a
major career and professional accomplishment for Goethals (206). At
the height of canal construction, Goethals managed a workforce nearly
half the size of the entire Army, and he served as governor of the Canal
Zone from 1914 until September 1916 when he returned to the United
States to retire from the Army. The chapter titled “Making the Dirt
Fly” was the best researched and most solidly presented portion of the
book and is good reading for anyone interested in the history of the
canal project (84).
The section of the book addressing organizational change and
the Army’s response to that change requires a rewind to the period
immediately prior to the canal project, the Spanish-American War of
1898. The Spanish-American War thrust the United States onto the
world stage as a major power. That said, US conduct of the SpanishAmerican War was an amateurish affair on many accounts. Public and
political reactions to the haphazard way in which the war was conducted
resulted in several postwar investigations.
These inquiries led to Elihu Root being appointed Secretary of War.
Root had no military background, but he quickly recognized the need
for serious military reform affecting the Army. The resulting Root
Reforms had two primary thrusts: enhanced professional military
education in the form of the Army War College and a reformed Command
and General Staff College and the establishment of a general staff to
direct and coordinate planning across the Army. These reforms were
fiercely resisted in the upper echelons of the Army’s officer corps, most
notably by the then-powerful bureau chiefs. The institutions intended to
enable reform were created, but they were provided no ability to generate
the desired changes.
The United States entered World War I in April 1917, and
Goethals reentered public service to support the war effort. He was
eventually appointed the Army’s Quartermaster General responsible
for reorganizing the logistics aspects of a then-failing war effort. As
in previous conflicts, the Army’s organization and war preparation
efforts were not up to the challenges of World War I: quickly building
an expeditionary force facing high-intensity, industrial-age warfare.
Building on the organizational and managerial skills he developed
during the Panama Canal construction project, Goethals quickly
reorganized the Army’s logistics enterprise to meet those challenges. As
McGovern points out, Goethals’s efforts are an interesting case study
of politics, bureaucratic infighting, organizational dysfunction, and
resistance to change.
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Although the events described in the change and continuity portions
of the book occurred more than 100 years ago, the echoes of those
troubles are still with the Army today. In that sense, the book is relevant
to the current period. The Army’s institutional culture is very strong,
and culture is hard to change.
McGovern correctly notes large, hierarchical organizations
that promote primarily from within tend to be resistant to change.
Substantive change often requires a strong exogenous shock, such as
those associated with the Spanish-American War or the failing war
effort in late 1917. As the Army’s responses to the Root Reforms of 120
years ago illustrate and caution, institutional culture can lag and impede
change initiatives. Cultural change cannot simply be commanded.
Consistent and visionary leadership in the wake of crises that lead to
change initiatives is essential. Such leadership was absent in the wake of
the Root Reforms, and the subsequent change efforts foundered. That
said, McGovern’s treatment of Army change and continuity during the
historical period covered is rather shallow and not the best researched
or presented aspect of the book.

The Impeachers: The Trial of Andrew Johnson
and the Dream of a Just Nation
By Brenda Wineapple
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

W
New York: Random House,
2019
543 pages
$32.00

ithin the last several years, a number of new books have been
published on the process of impeaching an American president.
Brenda Wineapple’s outstanding The Impeachers is distinct from the others.
She examines in depth the first US presidential impeachment and all
the characters involved—without using her research as groundwork for
discussing contemporary political issues. Despite Wineapple’s focus on
the 1800s, readers cannot help but notice the striking similarities between
President Johnson and President Trump even though both men faced
different political cultures and contexts. There are limits, however, to
the parallels. Johnson, who came to power after Lincoln’s assassination,
was never elected president and was viewed by many Americans as
an accidental head of state. He did not have a powerful political base
supporting him, and he faced a hostile Republican Party in Congress that
regularly overrode his vetoes on the most important legislation.
Johnson was widely known to be racist. He had previously owned
slaves and was offended by the idea of black people rising above menial
labor. Despite his Tennessee roots, he did side with the Union during
the Civil War and was the only senator from a Confederate state to
oppose secession. Wineapple maintains Johnson’s motives for these
actions were complex and centered on his dislike of the Southern
planter elite he believed treated him in condescending ways because of
his impoverished childhood and background as an indentured servant
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and tailor. Johnson also feared black equality more than he resented the
Southern aristocracy, and Wineapple argues that as president Johnson
sought to return former slaves to conditions very much like slavery
because of his racial prejudice and fear free blacks would compete for
jobs usually held by poor whites.
Johnson opposed civil rights legislation, tried to limit the effectiveness
of institutions created to help ex-slaves, and discounted violence by the
Ku Klux Klan as isolated incidents. He wildly used his pardon power in
ways that allowed wartime Southern politicians and senior Confederate
officers to return to power. This approach surprised many Washington
observers since Johnson was known to resent the Southern aristocracy.
Wineapple clarifies this paradox by pointing out that while Johnson’s
resentment ran deep, he also coveted the respect of Southern elites, and
he enjoyed it when they requested pardons from him.
Johnson also sought to limit the power of the Army to protect blacks
and pro-Union whites in the former Confederate states, placing him in
conflict with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who sought to use the
Army to protect black Americans and others cooperating with federal
authorities in the South. Johnson eventually removed Stanton from
office and fell into a carefully laid trap. Congress had previously passed
the constitutionally questionable Tenure of Office Act which denied the
president the ability to fire Senate-confirmed cabinet members without
the agreement of the Senate. Johnson’s violations of the Tenure of
Office Act became the core of the House of Representative’s Articles
of Impeachment, although Article 11 was a catchall involving Johnson’s
contempt for Congress and refusal to execute important laws passed by
Congress. Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives in
February 1868 with his trial in the Senate ending in late May 1868.
The impeachment trial was the most sordid and complex political
machination imaginable. As the first presidential impeachment, there was
no precedent to draw upon. Congress improvised its procedures based
on the brief and somewhat vague principles outlined in the Constitution.
Many involved had personal agendas, as Wineapple shows. Underlying
these concerns was a strong belief among Republicans that if they could
wait until the November election, General Ulysses S. Grant would
almost certainly be voted into office as a strong Republican president.
Ultimately, Johnson avoided removal from office by one vote.
Republican Senator Edmund G. Ross, who had previously promised
to vote against Johnson, decided at the last minute to support him.
Wineapple suggests bribery might have been the decisive factor for
the changed vote, although she also quotes an observer as stating the
married Ross had become “infatuated to the extent of foolishness” with a
beautiful much-younger woman who was an adamant Johnson supporter
(359). Johnson completed the remaining months of his presidency as a
discredited and largely powerless lame duck, returned to Tennessee after
the expiration of his term without attending the inauguration of General
Grant, and sought for many years to regain his former position as a US
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senator—then elected by state legislators. Johnson finally gained enough
support in the state legislature in 1875 to return to his Senate position
and served just under five months before suffering a fatal stroke.
Wineapple concludes Johnson was impeached for his efforts to
restore the Union with the old Southern elite in place and most black
Americans returned to slavery-like conditions. The first presidential
impeachment was an extremely political process and did not look
remotely like an objective legal proceeding. Johnson was impeached for
political and moral reasons. Wineapple believes this may be the most
interesting lesson from the first presidential impeachment, and the
dominance of politics in future impeachment trials will be extremely
likely if not inevitable.
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Defense Studies
Post Wall, Post Square: How Bush, Gorbachev,
Kohl, and Deng Shaped the World after 1989
By Kristina Spohr
Reviewed by Dr. Ronald J. Granieri, associate professor of history,
US Army War College

W

hile history did not end in 1989, something began. Determining
what that “something” might be has bedeviled the analysis
of world affairs ever since. The year most famous for the fall of the
Berlin Wall, with all the symbolism attached to it, marked for many
Europeans and most Americans the end—or at least the beginning of
the end—of the Cold War. Events in 1990–91 then marked the start of
President George H. W. Bush’s new world order, which he suggested
would be based on democracy, freer trade, and multinational cooperation.
At the same time communism collapsed in Europe and sent shock
waves to Moscow, communism triumphed in China. Anyone who lived
through the first months of 1989 remembers many analysts expected
to see fundamental change in Beijing, not Berlin. The decision by the
Chinese communist leadership on June 4 to send tanks into the Square
of Heavenly Peace appeared to bring all such dreams to an end.
As disparate as the events in Berlin and Beijing were, Kristina
Spohr believes it is clear in retrospect that the contemporary world
has lived in their dual shadow ever since. State socialism collapsed in
Eastern Europe, but the Chinese model of state capitalism survived the
challenge and has shaped the course of China and modern geopolitics.
The hopefulness of the 1990s may have given way to the grim realities
of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, and now to the even-grimmer
realities of pandemics and lockdowns, but there is no doubt the current
multipolar world emerged from the collapse of Cold War bipolarity
and the “unforeseen consequences of the design flaws in the new order
improvised with such haste and ingenuity by the shapers of world affairs
in 1989–92” (9).

Spohr, one of the finest of a new generation of international
historians who have made their careers in the post–Cold War world,
undertakes the daunting task of bringing these different stories
together. In her massive and deeply researched book, she attempts to
place the events and leaders in Europe, North America, and Asia into
a common context to understand the “troubled birth” of the post-Wall
and post-Square order as we ponder the implications of the order’s
current demise (9).
Spohr mines a range of archives and sources in multiple languages
to develop her narrative. Highlighting the interplay of personalities
and policies, she weaves the actions of Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev,
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Helmut Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping—the main actors as her title
suggests—with the significant roles played by other world leaders,
from Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand to Václav Havel,
Boris Yeltsin, and Li Peng.
Spohr helps readers develop a truly global understanding of the
tumultuous era from 1989–92 and see how connected the events
appeared to actors at the time—especially readers who may not have
experienced these events directly. Events in Beijing, combined with
memories of failed popular uprisings in Eastern Europe in previous
years, encouraged political leaders across the Atlantic to keep their
expectations for change in Europe modest in fall 1989 and may have
lulled some Eastern European communist leaders, especially Gorbachev,
into a false sense of security about their ability to manage change. East
German leader Erich Honecker openly speculated about a “Chinese
solution” to the protests in Leipzig and other cities in October 1989
before being dissuaded from such reckless violence by more reformminded colleagues (149). But even these colleagues, once they had
pushed Honecker into retirement, underestimated the degree to which
the rejection of violent repression meant the end of the East German
regime altogether.
Similarly, Kohl and his colleagues in Bonn, who had spoken
generally about their desire for German unification, scrambled to
respond when protesters began chanting “We are one people!” (150).
Kohl surprised many critics with his willingness to improvise, but the
path to German reunification was far from smooth. While the happy
European revolutions of 1989 would not have been possible without the
enthusiasm of the crowds, the aftermath required the negotiating skills
of leaders who themselves were not sure how things would turn out.
Spohr also helps readers understand the global reverberations of
those heady moments in 1989. The revolutions in Europe had hardly
settled down when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990,
providing a further push toward a different international system, just
as the failure of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union to save their former client
provided further fuel for plotters to try to overthrow Gorbachev in
August 1991. Nor did the surprising swift victory over Iraq guarantee
re-election for Bush. In his “A Europe Whole and Free” speech in Mainz
on May 31, 1989, Bush pursued a complex strategy, embracing German
reunification and the development of a Europe “whole and free” while
also trying to maintain Gorbachev in power and positive relations
with China. American domestic politics ultimately caught up with the
global statesman.
Rejecting a man they considered aloof and too focused on
international affairs, American voters elected Bill Clinton, who
during the campaign rejected Bush’s willingness to “coddle dictators
from Baghdad to Beijing” only to become a strong advocate once in
office of Chinese integration into the World Trade Organization (574).
Furthermore, Bush’s last acts in office included dispatching US troops to
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help war-torn Somalia—the first of many ill-fated efforts by Washington
to use its influence as the world’s surviving superpower to bring about
humanitarian political change.
As if the obvious number of foreshadowed events in her narrative
were not enough, Spohr works in references to Donald Trump at
the beginning and end of her book, both to remind readers of the
consequences of decisions made in the 1990s and to reflect upon the
changes in American leadership over the decades since. “Bush and his
fellow managers of the 1989–91 post–Cold War transition had kept their
eyes on the global balance,” Spohr concludes. “They also understood
that US power had to be exercised within a framework of political
alliances and economic interdependence” (598). That attitude also
shaped, in varying degrees, the policies of Bush’s successors. Trump,
however, had already signaled his rejection of this approach in a March
1990 interview in Playboy. Asked how President Trump would govern,
Trump declared: “He would believe very strongly in extreme military
strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he
wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it,
understand it” (599).
Trump’s plans for the future seemed out of step with the careful
diplomatic approach of the leaders of his time. His rise to power,
though, is indicative of how that careful approach sowed the seeds of its
own destruction. Spohr does not say if a new era has begun in the last
three years, but she does show the world has come a long way from the
optimistic autumn of 1989.

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy
By Dmitry Adamsky
Reviewed by Dr. Robert E. Hamilton, professor of Eurasian studies,
US Army War College, and retired US Army colonel

W

ill a more religious Russia be harder to deter and more willing to
coerce adversaries? Will the rise in religiosity in Russia influence
the Kremlin’s decisions on when to go to war and how Russia conducts
itself in war? And will the unique nexus between the Russian Orthodox
Church and Russia’s nuclear forces enable the nuclear forces to win
budget battles against rivals in the coming era of budget austerity?
These are some of the questions Dmitry Adamsky raises in Russian
Nuclear Orthodoxy.
Adamsky is not the first scholar to notice orthodoxy has become
a key component of Russia’s post-Soviet geopolitical identity. But his
argument that the Russian Orthodox Church and the nuclear community
have formed a uniquely strong bond is new and deserves serious
consideration. If this bond is real, it bears directly on the answers to the
questions posed above. The dual phenomena of rising religiosity and the
unique bond between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear community
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could raise the profile of nuclear weapons in Russian national security
strategy, directly affect Russia’s willingness to use force in a crisis, and
influence how it uses that force.
Adamsky notes correctly there is a lack of evidence in international
relations research that military clergy restrain states from going to war
or moderate their conduct in war due to moral and ethical considerations.
In Russia’s case the extreme conservatism and nationalism of the
Orthodox Church may have the opposite effect. The church has long
seen its role as shielding Russia from the supposed threat posed by a
“decadent and secular” West. And Russia’s nuclear deterrent has long
been a staple of its national security strategy.
The marriage between the two thus echoes the words of National
Security Council (NSC)-68 published in 1950, which warned of the
threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union “animated by a new fanatic faith,
antithetical to our own” (The Executive Secretary, “NSC-68: A Report
to the National Security Council,” Naval War College Review 28, no. 3
(May–June 1975): 53). The faith then was Marxism, and the faith now is
Russian Orthodoxy. The two are different in their views of history and
a just world order but are alike in exhorting their followers to extreme
measures to carry out their visions, and in that married to one of the
world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they make Moscow a dangerous and
unpredictable adversary.
Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy is exhaustively researched, logically
organized, and surprisingly readable—especially for a book taking
on a topic of this magnitude. Adamsky’s use of Russian and English
interviews, scholarly and journalistic sources, and official records
provide a firm foundation for building his argument. The book traces
the evolution of the relationship between the church and the nuclear
community over the three decades of Russia’s post-Soviet history.
In each decade, Adamsky examines three themes. The first theme is
the general development of the church-state relationship in Russia. The
second theme is the more specific development of the “faith-nuclear
nexus”—the relationship between the church and Russia’s nuclear
weapons community (29). The third theme is strategic mythmaking
or the deliberate “reading of religious connotations into history” that
sought to prove “a causal link between the spiritual support of the
church and battlefield successes” (150).
Over these three decades, the partnership between the
church and the nuclear community, which began as a grassroots
movement in the 1990s, eventually acquired support from the top. The
Russian military in the 1990s was in profound shock and systemic
crisis, and the church was just emerging from decades of enforced
atheism and persecution at the hands of the Communist Party. In this
environment, the two institutions developed a relationship that served
both. The church could provide remedies for the military problems
of motivation and discipline and fill the ideological vacuum left by
the collapse of Soviet communism. And for the church, the military

Book Reviews: Defense Studies

131

represented a way to expand its influence by reaching out to all social
groups and reestablishing a close relationship with the government.
Sustained lobbying from Patriarchs Alexey II and Kirill in the 2000s
turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a key player in Russian politics.
By the end of the decade, “nuclear churching” became Kremlin policy,
with support from the top supplementing the initial grassroots movement
of the 1990s (168). During this decade, the church met all four of its main
goals: the introduction of religious instruction in public schools, the
revival of the military chaplaincy, the restitution of pre-Soviet church
property, and the marginalization of “nontraditional” denominations.
An actual doctrine of nuclear orthodoxy also emerged in this
decade. With the political, economic, and social crises of the 1990s
behind it, Russia began the search for a new national ideal. Among the
views vying for attention in a variation on the traditional competition
between Slavophiles, Westerners, Atlanticists, and Eurasianists was
that of Egor Kholmogorov. Kholmogorov, the author of the nuclear
orthodoxy doctrine, was an ultraconservative who won the For
Feminism “Sexist of the Year” poll in 2014 for advocating punching
women who utter the word “sexism” (Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber,
“Publicist Who Advocated Punching Women in the Face Named ‘Russia’s
Sexist of the Year’,” Moscow Times, March 12, 2015). Kholmogorov’s
doctrine rested on two postulates: “to stay Orthodox, Russia should
be a strong nuclear power” and “to stay a strong nuclear power, Russia
should be Orthodox” (161).
The last 10 years, which Adamsky calls the “Operationalization
Decade,” have solidified and institutionalized the marriage between the
Orthodox Church and the nuclear community in Russia (7). During
this decade, Russia’s nuclear arsenal gained additional prominence
in Russian national security doctrine; simultaneously, the church
provided a foundation for Russia’s new geopolitical identity. Adamsky’s
identification of and explanation for this nexus between the church and
the nuclear community in Russia may not be the only answer to the
questions this book raises. Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy, however, provides
richer and more accurate answers to these questions and enhances
readers’ understanding of some important phenomena in international
relations and military strategy.
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Why We Fight
By Mike Martin
Reviewed by Anthony King, chair of war studies, Warwick University
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ike Martin’s Why We Fight belongs to a growing genre of literature,
books written by junior officers based on their experiences of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This canon includes Patrick Hennessey’s
The Junior Officers’ Reading Club, Patrick Bury’s Callsign Hades, Charlotte
Madison’s Dressed to Kill, Evan Wright’s Generation Kill, Craig Mullaney’s The
Unforgiving Minute, Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground Up, and Martin’s
first book on the Helmand conflict, An Intimate War. There is nothing
new about subaltern literature. Because they tend to be very literate and
have experienced close combat firsthand, lieutenants and captains have
written many important memoirs of the wars in which they served.
Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, Edmund Blunden, Robert Graves, and
Ernst Jünger produced major works about the First World War. Even
junior officers of the Vietnam War produced important contributions to
this genre with Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War, Bing West’s The Village,
and, perhaps, the finest of all, Karl Marlantes’ Matterhorn and What It Is
Like to Go to War.
Why We Fight is unusual in that it is not a memoir; Martin mentions
his experiences in Afghanistan only obliquely. Instead, it is a general
investigation of why humans go to war at all. In this, Why We Fight is
most like Simpson’s War from the Ground Up. Written by two Afghan
veterans, the two books form an interesting pair. While Simpson (an
idealist) reduces war to its narratives, Martin (a materialist) believes war
is in the genes, and the evolutionary psychology of humans compels
them to fight.
For Martin war is best understood as an evolutionary adaptation.
Humans go to war to protect their genes. Of course, there is an obvious
conundrum here, which Martin seeks to resolve. War is a risky business,
and it has been almost universally prosecuted by young men, whom it
eliminates in large numbers before they have had a chance to reproduce.
Consequently, as a reproductive strategy, it should be irrational for young
men to fight. They are likely to die, while their cowardly but long-living
brothers will have a greater chance of reproduction; paradoxically, on
this account, the weak are, in evolutionary terms, fitter.
If the brave have always died young, then humans should have
become less and less warlike. Martin perceptively notes, however, there
is a secondary social mechanism at work. While young men might be
killed if they go to war, if they shirk their collective duty to defend their
community, they will definitely be excluded by it. They will be ostracized
and may even suffer punishment or death. Consequently, by not going to
war—for all its attendant risks—they reduce their reproductive fitness
more than suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune: “We
fight because losing membership of our in-group—whether because it
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is disintegrating, or because we’re being shunned for not fighting—is
evolutionary suicide” (89). Crucially, by fighting for their community,
soldiers will earn status and a sense of belonging, which Martin identifies
as the two master motivations for going to war.
Martin proves historically the claim that humans fight for status
and membership within their social group and also provides personal
evidence of it. The book is punctuated with italicized autobiographical
passages, which constitute some of the strongest prose in the book. In
one passage, Martin describes how he was asked by his brother why he
had volunteered for Helmand: “I pondered his question for a moment,
and answered from the gut. ‘I want to see how I do,’ I replied, pausing
before adding, ‘I want to prove myself’” (41). Later he describes the
conflict he saw in southern Afghanistan. Against the official narratives,
there was no simple war between the Taliban and the Afghan government
there. Instead, there was a series of internecine struggles between power
brokers, clans, and tribes against their local rivals. In each case, belligerents
were motivated by immediate concerns of collective self-protection and
promotion; by status and group membership, in short (124–25).
Martin’s sociological explanation of why humans are willing to fight
is both powerful and economical, and sociologists, anthropologists,
and many philosophers would certainly concur with him. He does
not find this account sufficient, however, and proceeds, on its basis,
to build a much more complex evolutionary edifice. Although humans
certainly fight for status and belonging, Martin claims these emotional
commitments are underpinned by biochemical mechanisms, particularly
testosterone, which makes humans individually aggressive, violent, and
risk-taking, and oxytocin, which heightens their attachment to their
group. Humans are chemically programmed to love their kin, while
also accepting—even relishing—the risks required to defend them. For
Martin, these two chemicals explain why individuals can risk going to
war for a social group they love.
At the same time, as a result of evolution, the human brain has
become imprinted with a series of subconscious, innate modules which
structure consciousness. These modules allow humans to form extremely
large social groups, extending well beyond any genetic heritage. Martin
identifies three major modules laid down in the Paleolithic Period: moral
codes, religion, and ideology. These modules align individual human
biochemistry to potential vast polities. Instead of just loving their
immediate kin and being willing to fight and die for them, humans are
conditioned by these modules to form oxytocin attachments to their
societies, faith communities, or nations, consisting of thousands, maybe,
millions of individuals. Testosterone ensures humans have been willing
to fight for these attachments.
Why We Fight is an ingenious exposition of a long-standing
philosophical problem and an evolutionary psychological explanation
of war. It is an intriguing and unusual book for a former subaltern to
have written and is an academic and, in places, dense inquiry. Serving
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soldiers may find the book less useful and accessible than other works
by Helmand veterans that deal more immediately with the experience
of combat itself or Martin’s previous book on Helmand. Scholars and
students of war, however, will read the book with great interest and ask
why a British veteran of the Helmand campaign felt obliged to look
beyond immediate strategic and political explanations in the struggle to
understand the war in which he fought.

Culture and the Soldier: Identities, Values,
and Norms in Military Engagements
Edited by H. Christian Breede
Reviewed by Dr. Kellie Wilson-Buford, associate professor of history, Arkansas
State University

Vancouver and Toronto:
UBC Press, 2019
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$89.95

I

n spring 2015 a small group of senior military officers, defense policy
analysts, and academics gathered at Queens University for a conference
on the cultural dimensions of combat, battlefield operations, and
multinational defense cooperation. The goal of the conference, hosted
by the Centre for International and Defence Policy, was to develop policy
recommendations to improve standards of cultural practice within the
Canadian military and its partner states in addressing current and future
crises worldwide. This unique book was the result of the conference.
Identifying culture as both a force that shapes military identities,
values, and norms and a tool employed by militaries while conducting
operations, Culture and the Soldier makes a compelling case for why cultural
considerations should occupy a more central position in Canadian
defense policy planning in particular and in defense policy planning
more generally. While many studies have theorized about culture’s
impact on the military, very few have analyzed how militaries have
used culture as a tool to accomplish defense goals. H. Christian Breede
does just that and lays the foundation for culture to be understood and
employed in contemporary military engagements.
Part one, three chapters of qualitative research studies, examines
how Canadian culture—its values, identities, and norms—has shaped
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as an organization. Chapter one
argues that Canadian culture shaped how the experience of combat
was remembered among Francophone and Anglophone war veterans in
Afghanistan and highlights the challenges a multicultural fighting force
might face when trying to maintain unit cohesion and transition troops
back to civilian life.
Chapter two operationalizes culture as the “attitudes toward and
perceptions of gender roles and the appropriate behavior implied for
all members of the military” and illustrates how evolving gender values
and norms in Canadian civil society led to the CAF’s attempt at gender
integration (21). The CAF’s unwillingness to conceptualize gender as
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the representation of both femininity and masculinity was a key factor
in this unsuccessful attempt at gender integration.
Chapter three highlights the cultural implications for the relationship
between military casualties and society and argues Canadian civil
culture shaped how Canadians ritualized and memorialized military
casualties in Afghanistan, a view which has changed since the Korean
War. Allowing for public expression of casualty rituals coincided with
increased public support for the mission. Interestingly, this chapter
rejects Breede’s definition of culture as vague and defines culture as
the ascribed meanings given to symbols, heroes, and rituals. Despite
the contested definitions of culture presented, part one offers intriguing
examples of how Canadian culture has shaped the Canadian military.
Part two broadens its focus to analyze the ways militaries,
governments, and security sector agencies have used culture as a tool to
conduct operations. Chapters four and five explore the role of culture
in the conduct of Russia’s “hybrid war within the grey zone” and
reveal how the Kremlin and Russian security sector agencies leveraged
propaganda and manipulated their corporate images to achieve foreign
policy goals (84).
Where chapters four and five operationalize culture as popular
beliefs and public perceptions about current events that organizations
can manage and manipulate, chapter six defines culture as the
different and often competing meanings militaries and humanitarian
nongovernmental organizations ascribe to the words “security” and
“success.” The chapter illustrates how efforts to enhance cooperation
during crises have often resulted in short-term gains but long-term
setbacks in humanitarian effectiveness. Chapters seven and nine
highlight the necessity of both cultural education and a “social license
to operate” for troops deployed in any country not their own as
precursors to successful operations and the mental well-being of the
troops involved (197). Chapter eight examines the role of international
security organizations such as NATO and the George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies in fostering epistemic communities
based on alliance and cooperation.
The strengths of this volume are its interdisciplinary scope,
varied research methodologies, and contributor backgrounds that
range from international relations, security studies, anthropology, and
sociology to political science and literature. Notably absent from this
exciting amalgam of scholars are historians whose work could provide
important and necessary historical context for the various military
engagements addressed.
Perhaps a side effect of the volume’s interdisciplinarity is its somewhat
confusing organization. While part one focuses exclusively on the CAF,
part two ranges in focus from Russia and Ukraine to Canada, the United
States, and international security organizations and security schools and
centers. Additionally, part two’s nearly 150 pages more than double part
one’s 60 pages, leaving a significant imbalance of evidence and analysis.
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The result is a very focused and compelling argument for how culture
has shaped the CAF in the past few decades with little application to
other militaries on the one hand and a varied and more generalized
analysis of how militaries, governments, and organizations have used
culture as a means to achieve specific end goals on the other.
The qualitative nature of the volume’s research does not undermine
its importance in providing a useful template for future studies of
culture as both a force and a factor in militaries and military operations
worldwide. Despite its limitations, this volume of defense policy analysis
is critical reading for anyone interested in the cultural dimensions of
combat for the Canadian military and its partner states.

Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army’s Role in Creating
the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
By Pat Proctor
Reviewed by Dr. George Woods, professor of strategic leadership,
US Army War College

Columbia: University of
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n this time of great power competition and as depicted in the current
US National Defense Strategy, Lessons Unlearned presents a contrary
view of how the US Army sees itself. Author Pat Proctor confronts the
conventional view that the Army must build itself into a formidable,
technologically superior force for high-intensity conflict to counter
threats that emanate from Russia or China. He argues the US Army’s
culture prevents it from accepting anything else. He states the lessons that
should have been learned—from the series of low-intensity engagements
from the late 1980s through the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001—were ignored or never given a chance to become
institutionalized due to the Army’s cultural bias, thus resulting in the
decades-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army has failed to posture itself for success on two measures.
First, it fails to embrace responsibility for engaging in the political
dimension to reestablish failing or failed countries in which it must
operate. Second, it repeatedly fails to create the capabilities to operate
in low-intensity environments with needed capabilities like civil affairs,
psychological operations, engineers, military police, and other such
capabilities required in a low-intensity context. Consequently, the US
Army remains prepared for the short-term high-intensity fight, but
vulnerable to asymmetric threats that have caused the nation to be
embroiled in the “forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” as a result (4).
Proctor’s exhaustingly thorough analysis includes a chapter on the
lessons captured during operations in Somalia and Haiti and their effect
on ongoing modernization efforts, in this case Force XXI. Emphasizing
the Army’s reluctance to embrace the political dimension in both
campaigns as well as the effect of operations in urban environments
vis-à-vis nonstate actors created significant vulnerabilities. First, it
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negated US technological advantages, exposing US forces to vicious
street fighting and being outnumbered by lightly armed citizens.
Second, it complicated processes for ending the fight and reestablishing
stability in the country in crisis. While the lessons in Somalia were being
captured, the Army concurrently proceeded with its future within the
Force XXI framework.
In envisioning the force of the future, lessons from Somalia and in
the soon-to-follow campaign in Haiti had not yet had time to influence
new ways of thinking. Conflict was conceived to be war and operations
other than war. Although the Army was to be prepared for both, Proctor
clearly states that “transformation” effort in the Force XXI construct
clearly presented a high-intensity bias (9). Proctor, however, feels there
may have been a glimmer of hope as two organizations emerged that might
have enabled a fair dialogue about low-intensity capabilities the Army
needed to embrace. The Peacekeeping Institute established in 1993—
and the predecessor to today’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute—joined the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict
(A-AFCLIC) previously established in 1986 at Langley Air Force Base.
Those hopes were soon dashed in the next phase Proctor covers in the
chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the transformation effort to
succeed Force XXI, the Army After Next focus.
While serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996,
General Shalikashvili shared his vision for the US Armed Forces of
2010 in his Joint Vision 2010. The vision was wholeheartedly embraced
by General Reimer, the then serving Army Chief of Staff. Crafting the
supporting Army Vision 2010, Proctor holds General Reimer most
accountable for the demise of low-intensity conflict. Proctor faults
General Reimer for virtually expunging low-intensity dialogue within
the Army, as exemplified by decisions he made that withdrew Army
participation in the A-AFCLIC—which ultimately disbanded in 1996.
Concurrently, education in low-intensity conflict at Army professional
military education institutions waned and virtually disappeared from
the curriculum, particularly in the Command and General Staff College
and the US Army War College curricula. Altogether, these decisions
and outcomes served as evidence of the Army’s cultural blindness and
set the conditions for unpreparedness in operations and campaigns
that followed.
In the final chapter of analysis, Proctor presents further evidence
of the Army’s ill-preparedness for low-intensity conflicts. He uses
the campaign in Kosovo to show the Army’s inability to own its
responsibilities for operating effectively in this environment to achieve
the nation’s end. And in spite of General Shinseki’s original and
unexpected vision of the Interim and Objective Force concept unveiled
early in his tenure of office as General Reimer’s replacement, it, too,
became a concept that morphed into a more-deployable version of
high-intensity capability vice a force postured to also wage effective lowintensity conflict operations. Then the attacks on New York City and
the Pentagon occurred, embroiling the US Army in a seemingly endless
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campaign in two countries accused of harboring terrorists guilty of the
attacks or the ones to follow.
This does not end well. So, why would one choose to read this book?
If institutional culture is the reason for the US Army’s unpreparedness,
then what should one understand about the culture? First, cultures persist
over time. And over time many of its followers rarely, if ever, question
why they do the things they do. They become entrenched in the culture’s
practice; however, cultures are rife with implicit assumptions informed
by the norms they have practiced for decades, if not longer, and these
assumptions are often taken for granted and seldom challenged.
Consequently professionals should read thought-provoking works
like this one. Although readers may not agree with Proctor’s analysis
or the conclusions he draws from it, he creates an opportunity for
readers to reflect and reexamine, to consider critically the conclusions
drawn, and to accept the kernels of truth applicable—all trademarks of
critically thinking professionals who owe it to their constituents to give
Lessons Unlearned due consideration.

Book Reviews: Regional Studies 139

Regional Studies
India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers
By Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell
Reviewed by Dr. Arzan Tarapore, nonresident fellow, National Bureau of
Asian Research, Washington, DC

T

he United States has made a strategic bet on India. With the seemingly
unstoppable growth in Chinese power and influence in the region,
America has aggressively courted a deeper strategic partnership with India
and calculated a rising India aligned with US interests will better maintain
a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. While Washington is
largely focused on India’s conventional military capabilities and posture,
India also boasts a burgeoning nuclear weapons capability, which is the
subject of India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers.
Written by two young and accomplished scholars, this accessible and
thoroughly researched book fills an important niche in the Indo-Pacific
literature and should be required reading for American military leaders
and strategic analysts concerned with the area. Joshi and O’Donnell
systematically examine the contemporary nuclear balance between India
and Pakistan and China, its chief rivals. Their opinionated analysis is
informed but not weighed down by theory and history and advances
two major policy recommendations in a logical and clearly structured
fashion: for India, Pakistan, and China to increase transparency through
dialogue and for India to conduct a public defense policy review.
Joshi and O’Donnell’s core analysis focuses on Indian, Pakistani,
and Chinese nuclear capabilities and doctrines. They comprehensively
survey the status of India’s fissile material capabilities, delivery systems,
command and control, and missile defense and assess the historical
evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine and its approach to global
nonproliferation regimes.
They also analyze the implications of Pakistani and Chinese
nuclear capabilities and doctrine for Indian nuclear strategy. Pakistan,
for example, may have lowered the threshold for nuclear use with the
introduction of tactical nuclear weapons such as the 60-kilometer
range Nasr missile. “India refuses to accept that this threshold has
been lowered” and continues to develop plans for rapid mobilization of
conventional strikes (71). Similarly, the authors argue China’s military
reforms have bolstered its conventional active defense doctrine of
“seizing the initiative as early as possible, including initiating rapid
escalation at the outset of a conflict” through lavish use of conventional
missiles (95). In the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Chinese dyads these recent
developments have raised the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear
use, which is a recurring theme of the book.
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As Joshi and O’Donnell observe, several factors bedevil Indian
nuclear strategy and the analysis of it. India, unusual among nuclear
powers, faces twin nuclear rivals which pull its nuclear strategy in
different directions. For India, China is by far the more sophisticated
and comprehensive nuclear threat, demanding longer range and more
redundant Indian forces. Pakistan, however, remains the more immediate
danger, given the frequency of militarized crises and the centrality of
nuclear threats to Pakistani doctrine.
Another major complication in their analysis of Indian nuclear
strategy is the rapid evolution in capabilities and doctrine, which presents
an analytic target that is not only opaque but also fast moving. India
is on the cusp of deploying its first intercontinental ballistic missile,
the 5,000-kilometer Agni V, which can potentially reach all major cities
in China, and is also rapidly developing a missile defense capability
through indigenous technology and the acquisition of the Russian S-400
antiaircraft missile system.
Alongside its rivals, China and Pakistan, India is fielding a
new nuclear ballistic-missile submarine. As Joshi and O’Donnell
make clear, these and other new capabilities in the hands of India
and its rivals are rapidly changing the dynamics of the regional
nuclear triangle in ways their strategists and US analysts cannot yet
fully appreciate.
While Joshi and O’Donnell admirably tackle some issues, other
questions remain unaddressed, especially two issues that are particularly
salient for American defense leaders. First, they downplay a potential,
hotly debated paradigmatic shift in Indian nuclear doctrine that
moves away from “No First Use” and toward preemptive counterforce
targeting against enemy nuclear forces. This perspective may simply be
a matter of timing.
Much of the best evidence for the shift—including, most starkly,
an August 2019 statement by the serving defense minister—emerged
after this book was written. In chapter 5, Joshi and O’Donnell
acknowledge India is increasingly debating the unrevised 2003 nuclear
doctrine and moving away from existing doctrine may be closer than
they suggest. India could simply pepper its doctrine with ambiguity,
without publishing new doctrine, and this action would have massive
implications for regional nuclear stability.
Second, while the book’s scope is limited to nuclear strategy,
readers may also benefit from the exploration of parallel developments
in India’s overall security strategy. The Indian government led by Prime
Minister Narendra Modi has taken added risk in its crises with Pakistan
and has ratcheted up its crisis responses in an effort to create space for
conventional options. Again, the starkest evidence came after this book
was written, when India launched an unprecedented air strike against a
terrorist target in Pakistan in February 2019. This deliberate generation
of risk will influence how India and Pakistan act in the next inevitable
crisis and may over time shape their nuclear deterrence models.
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As Joshi and O’Donnell argue persuasively, the risk of inadvertent
escalation between India and its rivals is growing. India and Nuclear Asia:
Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers is an excellent introduction for leaders and
analysts seeking to understand those risks.

Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the FortyYear Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion,
and Collective Memory in the Middle East
By Kim Ghattas
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

I

n Black Wave, journalist Kim Ghattas has produced an insightful study
of the rise of political, religious, and cultural intolerance in various key
Middle Eastern countries as well as adjacent Pakistan and Afghanistan
since the late 1970s. The black wave in the book’s title is highly nuanced,
but is summed up by Ghattas as the “intellectual and cultural darkness
that slowly engulfed [the region] in the decades following the fateful
year of 1979” (3).
Indeed, that year was an inflection point defined in the region by
three momentous events—the Iranian revolution, a regime-threatening
uprising in Mecca, and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.
Ghattas maintains all these events were important and produced
changes that rippled throughout the entire region, dramatically
increased religious intolerance, and fed into a new and more virulent
level of sectarian strife among Sunni and Shia Muslims. Throughout the
book, Ghattas includes personal stories about individuals struggling for
freedom of thought and the more liberal interpretations of Islam. Many
individuals were assassinated or marginalized in response to their efforts
against extremist influence.
The most important 1979 event was the Iranian revolution. Ghattas
notes Iran’s last shah was overthrown by a coalition of groups and
not simply the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whom
she characterizes as a cunning, ruthless, and power-hungry man. She
maintains in addition to leftists and other anti-monarchists opposing
the shah, there were also a number of moderate clerics, some of whom
died under suspicious circumstances and consequently left Khomeini
unchallenged for clerical leadership.
Initially, the Saudis were uncertain about the meaning of this change.
They had previously worried about the shah’s regional ambitions but saw
him as a competitor who would only take the rivalry so far. The new
regime puzzled the Saudi leadership, but the establishment of an Islamic
Republic appeared to be a manageable problem, and Saudi Arabia’s
leaders were relieved Iran had not turned to a communist government.
Still, there were warning signs. Khomeini’s past writings were
clearly unfriendly to them, and his hostility soon manifested itself in
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efforts to export revolution beyond Iran’s borders and brush aside the
pro-American monarchies. Khomeini’s public statements and Iranian
propaganda made it clear Saudi Arabia had an unbending enemy. As
Ghattas notes, Iranian propaganda directed at the Saudi Shias was
particularly worrisome and helped to foster unrest.
Simultaneously with the increased concerns about Iran, the Saudis
had to cope with an unexpected shock in November 1979 when a large
group of well-armed rebels led by a former Saudi national guardsman
seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca and maintained control of it for more
than two weeks. The rebels proclaimed they were acting in the name of
an Islamic messiah (the mufti), who once in power would restructure
religious, economic, and foreign policy under a purified Islamic regime.
Saudi leaders were horrified the situation might spin out of control,
leading to a wider following for the rebels.
Unfortunately, using force at the holiest site in Islam was a problem.
Before they did so, the royal family sought the public approval of the
senior Saudi clergy and especially the ultraconservative blind sheikh,
Abdelaziz bin Baz. When they received this support and the military
response went forward, the rebels were defeated, but the mosque and its
environs were severely damaged in the battle. The political power of the
Saudi royal family was also harmed.
According to Ghattas, before 1979, the Saudi royal family was able
to dominate the clerics. After 1979, Ghattas maintains the religious
establishment “had become king” by helping to prop up a wounded
regime (206). The Iranians, for their part, took full advantage of the
situation and continuously accused Saudi Arabia of being an unfit
custodian of Islam’s two most holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. In
actions that infuriated Riyadh, the Iranians called for the creation of a
special Islamic Commission to take control of the holy sites.
Ghattas sees the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the third key
1979 event that reverberated throughout the region. She maintains,
for Saudi Arabia, helping the Afghan rebels fight Soviet forces was a
tremendous opportunity to reclaim some of the prestige and legitimacy
lost during the siege of Mecca. The Saudis, like the US leadership,
provided considerable assistance to the hard-line rebels and also worked
with Pakistan under Prime Minister Zia ul-Haq.
Ghattas characterizes Zia as a weak dictator who prolonged and
energized his regime by seizing control of the Afghan issue while
thoroughly infusing Pakistani society with ultraconservative Islam.
Western leaders, who might have objected to Zia’s authoritarianism in
other circumstances, were then too distracted with the Afghan War to
do so. Ghattas further shows that after Zia’s death and the end of the
Afghan War, generous Saudi funding continued to nurture the system
through less obvious but more pervasive involvement including a
religious publishing empire and a strong network of hard-line schools
and seminaries.
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Throughout this book, Ghattas displays a strong command of the
details of her subject matter and considers the spin-off effects of the
Saudi-Iranian rivalry for countries such as Egypt and Lebanon. She
suggests the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was linked
to Saudi and Iranian competition on questions of Islamic purity and
activism. She also mentions periods of moderation and détente between
Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic, but points out that these episodes
have been ephemeral. Ghattas suggests there is a moderate political
and religious identity throughout the Islamic world that will eventually
defeat the extremists because of the bravery of good people, but this
revolution remains to be seen.
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Technology and War
Power to the People: How Open Technological
Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists
By Audrey Kurth Cronin
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute
at the University of Southern California

O

ne of the world’s leading experts on security and terrorism, author
Audrey Kurth Cronin is currently a professor of international
security at American University’s School of International Service. She
has been a faculty member at the US National War College, has served in
the US executive branch, and has an Oxford University graduate degree.

Power to the People is the by-product of a major multiyear endeavor
supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation which draws upon
the Power to the People Terrorism Innovation Database (P2P-PVID)
developed by Cronin, George Mason University, and American
University graduate research assistants (431). Three datasets were
created focusing on dynamite manufacture, adoption, and use (1867 to
1934); AK-47 manufacture, dissemination, and use (1947 to present);
and contemporary drone and related autonomous systems manufacture,
dissemination, and use. For transparency and validation purposes,
the data is available at audreykurthcronin.com, which also serves as
Cronin’s marketing site (273–81).
The book includes an introduction, three sections comprised of
nine chapters, and a conclusion followed by two appendices, notes,
books cited, an index, and acknowledgements for the detailed main
body contexts (269–72). The book is heavily referenced with more than
100 pages of notes and book citations. My analysis of this information
confirmed Cronin undertook a comprehensive literature review related
to technology, war, and terrorism. A peppering of pictures, drawings,
and maps can be found throughout the book.
Addressing a number of themes and issues, Power to the People is an
intellectual and well-written tour de force—at times dense, yet thankfully
less academic, in its writing style and in the amount of historical and
contemporary information packed into its pages. First, Cronin “explores
how individuals and groups who engage in political violence have
repeatedly made use of emerging technologies to wreak havoc, and how
they’re likely to do so in the future” (2). She ties this issue into the book’s
first section which “introduces predominant ways of thinking about the
innovation and diffusion of military technology and demonstrates their
shortfalls as regards the current era” and “examines consistent patterns
of the diffusion of lethal technology to violent nonstate actors in the
modern era” (14).
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Second, Cronin places “current technological advances into the
historical context of key innovations used” and answers the question
“why certain kinds of emerging technologies are rapidly adopted by
rogue actors” with an emphasis on leveraging the dynamite and AK-47
datasets (2). She ties this issue into the book’s second section which
shows how these two innovations ultimately “drove global waves of
nonstate violence, in both cases culminating in major upheaval in the
international order” (14).
Third, Cronin leverages the drone dataset developed and focuses
“on technologies that were developed with good intentions, such as
digital media and drones . . . But some of them can be fashioned into
relatively low-cost, powerful, and precise weapons” (5). She argues
“Today’s drones, advanced robotics, 3D printing, and autonomous
systems have more in common with dynamite and Kalashnikovs than
they do with military technologies like the airplane and the tank” (14).
Cronin’s core insights are clustered around five themes—“powerful
economic incentives for diffusion, technological optimism and a
boom in tinkering, new communications technologies are powerful
incentives to violence, militaries are facing the innovator’s dilemma and
disruptive private armies and the ISIS precedent” (257, 256–62). Her
protectionist guidance provided against this identified threat is based on
the presumption: “The most effective way to respond to the fast-moving
changes of an open revolution is to align all the participants, including
government, industry, and individual citizens, around incentives for
developing protections” (264). Her guidance is focused on the profit
motive for protections, that regulation is not necessarily strangulation,
and building stronger national security (264–68).
The only disappointing element of the book is its theoretical
embargo of John Robb’s well-publicized Brave New War: The Next Stage
of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Wiley, 2007). Robb, a colorful
military analyst and entrepreneur, detailed his open-source warfare
construct—modeled on the open-source movement in software
development—13 years prior to Cronin’s elegant work but has been
ignored, or possibly overlooked, for his vital defense community
contributions. In Cronin’s defense, Robb’s construct runs parallel to her
and James Moor’s “‘open’ and ‘closed’ technological revolutions” focus
dating back to at least 2005, and Cronin’s subsequent focus on state
military power (285).
The reviewer fully endorses Power to the People as a first-rate effort
and sees wisdom in the antidisruptive, protectionist-focused strategic
guidance proposed for democracies derived from Cronin’s key
perception that:
We must also be mindful of the scale and breadth of vulnerability we have
built into our societies. The Internet of Things provides an avenue of access
into millions of Internet-connected devices and appliances. With artificial
intelligence, single individuals will have a shot at building armies without
the need to collect large numbers of human beings. Semi-autonomous and
autonomous weapons systems will enable small forces to hold their own
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against vastly superior forces. On our current trajectory, without both better
defensive measures and greater regulation of risk, the result will be wars of
attrition that democracies cannot win (267).

At the same time, Cronin’s promotion of such a dead-hand approach
will at best only temporarily stave off the epochal shift in war and
conflict that is upon the world—initially waged by nonstate actors and
now increasingly conducted by authoritarian regimes. Senior members
of the defense community would do well to integrate Cronin’s guidance
with approaches from Brave New War that, while of a lesser pedigree and
a more marginal budget, make up for these deficiencies with a devilish
creativity and willingness to seize the future rather than attempt to
primarily fight it in the manner Cronin advocates.

America’s Covert War in East Africa:
Surveillance, Rendition, Assassination
By Clara Usiskin
Reviewed by Dr. An Jacobs, senior lecturer of international relations,
Nottingham Trent University, and visiting fellow, Institute of Diplomacy
and International Governance, Loughborough University London

A

merica’s Covert War in East Africa is a breath of fresh air—a
positive anomaly in the crowded counterterrorism literature.
Usiskin challenges readers with an emotive, self-confessed descriptive
and fragmented writing style. The book is not designed to serve as
an academic manuscript, nor does it provide an in-depth analysis of
security questions or counterterrorist activity in East Africa. Instead,
the book includes narratives on issues largely absent in mainstream
counterterrorism literature (1–5).
Due to its fragmented nature, the book’s main argument is
difficult to summarize—or to even detect. The book focuses on the
forgotten or hidden consequences of the Global War on Terror—the
“collateral damage”—emphasizing issues of rule of law and human
rights (5). Usiskin enhances awareness of these consequences and takes
readers on a journey across the lesser-known effects of the Global War
on Terror.
For example, Usiskin discusses the functioning of various extralegal US prisons designed for the detainment and interrogation of
“high-value detainees” and includes research on the rumors of the US
detention and transit of “high-value detainees” on the British island
of Diego Garcia (27). She studies US involvement in the design of
counterterrorism policies in the region and the impact of these policies
on civil society, human rights defenders, and journalists. She explores
US cooperation with East African states with regard to counterterrorism
efforts, as well as the human rights abuses committed by the US, UK,
and East African governments in this context.
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Usiskin also considers extrajudicial killings—of predominantly
Muslims—in Kenya as a consequence of the war on terror and how
especially Somali refugees in Kenya are negatively impacted by
counterterrorism policies. She looks at the link between counterpiracy
and counterterrorism and delves into the application of technology and
communication as part of a “holistic US counterterrorism strategy,”
including how drones are employed for surveillance and targeted
killings and how the use of spyware in counterterrorism undercuts
democratic practices (90).
While these topics merit an important place in the book’s broader
narrative, a few chapters stand out and deserve further attention.
“A Zanzibar Ghost,” for example, is quite the opening chapter. In a
strongly emotive and gripping tone, Usiskin tells the story of a man
from Zanzibar who is exposed to the US rendition program as a result
of a counterterrorist operation. Her vivid retelling of the man’s brutal
interrogation, torture, and various human rights abuses draws readers
in. Subsequent chapters build upon this theme, albeit in a somewhat
less-poignant manner. These chapters cover the rendition process—the
often unlawful transportation of terror suspects from one country to
another for interrogation—in more detail and further highlight the
related practices of torture and brutality.
Other fascinating sections of the book cover the impact of
counterterrorism on democratic practice and civil society, highlighting
how a “rule by law” system and a clamp down on the freedom of
expression have “stifled civil society” and set out to silence human
rights defenders and journalists, demonstrating the failure of rule
of law (141–50). Kenya’s frontline position in the Global War on Terror
has had a particular impact on the fate of Somalian refugees in Kenya,
who are facing the dual threat of Al-Shabaab on the one hand and
prosecution by Kenyan authorities on the other, “perpetuating a longestablished dynamic of exclusion and discrimination” by securitizing
refugees from Somalia and “othering” Somali Kenyans (157, 163).
Usiskin further explores the impact of the Global War on Terror
on democracy by focusing on the capacity of the US and Kenyan
governments to spy on Kenyan residents by checking private online
activity and by illustrating how surveillance powers—extended
under counterterrorism legislation—can be used to act against civil
society. With a specific focus on Kenya and Ethiopia, she explores
how spyware and hacking tools such as FinFisher play a vital part in
limiting political opposition and free speech “to carry out politicallymotivated prosecutions of civil society actors under domestic
counterterrorism legislation” (184).
Usiskin’s most significant strength throughout the book is her ability
to bring complex stories alive through a combination of the personal
accounts of victims, her own narratives, and a wealth of information
from reports and government documents. It is obvious Usiskin has
been in the thick of it herself, having spent extended periods in the
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region and having been exposed to abuse of government power herself,
which resulted in short periods of detainment and even deportation
from Kenya and Uganda for her work on ongoing human rights abuses
(83–88). Her expertise as a human rights investigator, her extensive
research on the Global War on Terror, and her experience in the
region provide readers with invaluable insights into the covert world of
rendition, secret detention, and targeted killings in East Africa. Without
a national security clearance or access to classified information, Usiskin
has obtained fascinating information and presents it in a very clear and
compelling style.
Despite the impactful nature of the book, it also has shortcomings.
The most important one being its lack of coherence and a consistently
applied analytical framework. Although it was never Usiskin’s intention
to provide this framework, with such a wealth of data, it seems a shame
not to draw meaningful conclusions. The book’s greatest merit, however,
is that it goes beyond the “intended consequences” of counterterrorism
and explores its “real-life” impact, which is often painful and complex (5).
Usiskin “hope[s] readers will go on to engage with other points of view,”
and she definitely succeeds in achieving this objective (2). Enhancing
awareness and giving voice to people who have not been heard is perhaps
the most meaningful contribution America’s Covert War in East Africa will
make to the education of senior members of the defense community,
who are generally exposed to a different counterterrorism narrative.
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Military History
Command: The Twenty-First-Century General
By Anthony King
Reviewed by David G. Fivecoat, leadership consultant and
retired US Army colonel

A

nthony King has produced a thought-provoking book. He examines
the change in division command since 1901 in the American,
British, French, and German armies in World War I, World War II,
Cold War counterinsurgencies, Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan and
current initiatives the armies are undertaking to transform their division
headquarters. Building upon Martin van Creveld’s Command in War,
John Keegan’s The Mask of Command, and Peter F. Drucker’s The Effective
Executive and using dozens of examples, King argues division command
has transformed from a more individualistic command in the twentieth
century to a more collectivized command in the last decade.
The division has existed as a military formation since the French
Revolution. In the last 120 years the division has typically included
10,000 to 25,000 soldiers under the command of a major general.
The division was, and is, the Landpower formation of choice—with
a mature leader a division is quickly deployable yet robust enough to
handle joint, combined, and multinational operations with significant
combat power. Examining the division in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries is a worthy task and should have been undertaken sooner. It
may be worthwhile for future writers to focus on one nation’s divisions,
doctrine, and actual command practices over the past 120 years to
develop a more detailed analysis of how the division and its command
have evolved.
One of King’s most important contributions is the concept that
command at any level is comprised of three facets: mission definition,
mission management, and leadership. Because I liked the concept so
much, I read the chapter twice. Prior to D-Day, for instance, US Major
General Maxwell Taylor defined the mission of the 101st Airborne
Division as being able to surprise the enemy by conducting a parachute/
glider assault, seize objectives, and defend against counterattacks. Once
the mission was defined, Taylor managed the division’s preparation
for and execution of the D-Day invasion and provided leadership
to the Screaming Eagles. Defining the mission for a division in a
counterinsurgency is more challenging—from my experience, the
mission definitions of division commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan
ran the gamut. Few commanders took on a broad mandate for the
mission, most took a narrow view, and some failed to even consider it.
The mission management and leadership styles of division commanders
varied in the post-9/11 invasions and counterinsurgencies as well.
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King’s second major contribution is the idea that the role of the
division commander has transformed—from the concept of an
individualistic, or heroic, division commander pre-9/11 to a more
collectivized commander since 9/11. He defines individualistic
command as a division commander, with a small staff, monopolizing
the responsibility for determining the mission, managing the execution,
making decisions, and providing leadership to the division. He uses
examples of General Erwin Rommel, commander of the German 7th
Panzer Division during the invasion of France in World War II; Major
General Julian Ewell, commander of the US 9th Infantry Division in
the Mekong Delta Region during the Vietnam War; General Sir Rupert
Smith, commander of the UK 1st Armored Division during Desert
Storm; and others to illustrate the individualistic command concept.
I think most military professionals will recognize this style of
division command.
More problematic to recognize is the idea of collectivized
command. The Oxford English Dictionary defines collectivize as “organize
(something) on the basis of ownership by the people.” King defines
collectivized command as “commanders, their deputies, subordinates,
and staff bound together in dense, professionalized decision-making
communities” that collectively determine the mission, manage the
solution, and provide leadership to the division (18). Here he examines
British Major General Nick Carter’s leadership of Regional Command
South in Afghanistan from 2009–10 and recent initiatives by the
US 82nd Airborne Division, the UK 3rd Division, and the French
divisional headquarters.
I agree with King that the post-9/11 division headquarters has
grown in size and developed a more bureaucratic process around
decision making. Larger headquarters have an insatiable appetite for
more information, more meetings, and more work from themselves
and their subordinate units. I have found little evidence in practice,
accounts of recent division actions in other books, and even in Command
where division commanders have collectivized the process of mission
definition, management, or leadership.
The most collectivized command process I know is the council of
war, used most famously in the American Civil War by Union General
George Meade at the Battle of Gettysburg on the night of July 2, 1863.
Although King does use General Stanley McChrystal’s networked and
collaborative approach to running the US Joint Special Operations
Command from 2003–8, this organization is not a division, and
McChrystal’s approach was not collectivized. King disappointingly cites
no solid examples of division commanders bringing their team of staff
and commanders together for a collectivized approach to decide on the
mission or how to manage the solution. Most telling, King’s interviews
with General David Petraeus, General Sir Rupert Smith, and General
James Mattis all rebuff his theory that collectivization happened in the
divisions they led.
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Like King, I believe the command of the division headquarters is
changing, and I appreciate him for recognizing the change and starting
the discussion. In the end, King’s conclusion misses the mark. The change
may be that divisions have simply grown from their former nimble roots
into large, bureaucratic, and unwieldy organizations. Perhaps divisions
and their commanders are embracing a more networked approach,
using reachback or trying to flatten the organization. The supporting
evidence King cites does not convince me the division command has
been collectivized.
All in all, Command is a good book since it made me think deeply
about the division and division command. Even with the noted
shortcomings, it is a worthwhile read for commanders and leaders at
all levels who need to think about how they define the mission of their
units or organizations, manage planning and execution, and lead.
It is also valuable for military officers and other senior leaders who
are thinking about the history and the future of the division and
division command.

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA
Post–Cold War Relationship
By David P. Oakley
Reviewed by Dr. Genevieve Lester, De Serio Chair of Strategic Intelligence,
US Army War College

T

he intelligence function is crucial to informed policy decisionmaking in all aspects of government. The priorities of the national
agencies—the producers of this intelligence—however, change over
time in response to changing threats, political context, individual
relationships among senior administration leadership, and budgetary
constraints. Subordinating Intelligence examines the relationship of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the Department of Defense and
considers how the relationship evolved in the period between the Cold
War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror.
There are at least two sides to the debate regarding the relationship
between military requirements and national intelligence. On the one
hand, the lack of appropriate intelligence support to military operations
has resulted in failures and the loss of life on multiple occasions. On
the other hand, supporting military operations can crowd out longerterm, strategic intelligence needs and alter the balance of the CIA’s
responsibilities—from supporting national policy makers to prioritizing
the needs of combat support agencies such as the National Security
Agency or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This change in
balance risks the CIA’s independence and can weaken its ability to focus
on its core mission (105). David Oakley offers a balanced discussion of
both sides of this calculus, although the argument leads to the CIA’s
minimization and the military’s ascension.
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Oakley argues that a series of presidential decisions led to the CIA
being ultimately “subordinated” to military operations (8). He shows
how this relationship developed, focusing on the intensity of change
in the post–9/11 security environment. He develops his argument with
illustrative historical episodes beginning with early interoperability
failures, such as the unsuccessful attempt to free US hostages from Iran
(1979), the invasion of Grenada (1983), and the bombing of the barracks
in Lebanon, also in 1983, that focused on the need for improved Joint
operations and intelligence support to military operations (12–13).
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986, with its singular reforms to the Department of Defense,
emerged from this friction among the services. As Oakley points out,
there was an increasing awareness that intelligence was crucial to this
next stage of improved Joint operations. This vulnerability was further
highlighted during Operation Desert Storm, a quick victory for the
military that highlighted gaps in intelligence support for military
operations (31–32). During this period the then President George
H. W. Bush pushed for greater intelligence support for the military;
the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 35,
which made intelligence support of military operations a top priority
of the Intelligence Community (152). Obviously, these developments
intensified when the CIA’s focus turned to counterterrorism and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the CIA’s strategic
emphasis on the state-level threat and reinforcing its subordination
to the military (155).
While the book is slim, it pursues a line of argument vigorously. A
broader discussion of the context, particularly the developing political
environment, could have helped guide readers through some rather
arcane territory and idiom. Even with that criticism, Subordinating
Intelligence fills an important gap in the literature on military operations
and intelligence. Military requirements and intelligence tend to be much
more focused on the order of battle and tactical operations. In contrast,
the literature on national intelligence does not delve deeply enough
into the military side and almost not at all into the integration of the
two functions.
Oakley’s unique exploration of the relationship between
the Department of Defense and the CIA is crucial to building a
broader discussion of the issues from both the practitioner and the
scholarly perspectives. Finally, as the military changes its focus from
counterterrorism to near-peer competition with rival nation-states, the
CIA will again be pushed to adapt to the new contingencies, and the
relationship between the agency and the military will shift again. Oakley
provides a valuable service in outlining the processes and interests that
will drive this adaptation today and in the future.
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Hitler’s First Hundred Days: When Germans
Embraced the Third Reich
By Peter Fritzsche
Reviewed by Dr. Jay Lockenour, chair and associate professor,
Department of History, Temple University

O

ne is tempted to review Hitler’s First Hundred Days as the final
installment of a trilogy that began with Fritzsche’s 1990 work,
Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany,
followed in 1997 by Germans into Nazis. All three works grapple with the
fall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the National Socialist German
Workers Party (NSDAP), and that party’s rapid establishment of a
monopoly on political power. Anyone who has taught a course on the
Third Reich knows students demand answer to difficult questions: “How
did this happen?” Was it a culture of authoritarianism? Was it ideology or
anti-Semitism? The Great War? The economy?
Fritzsche’s answer has evolved over the years. He still downplays
the role of the economy and the Great Depression in terms of
electoral motivation. He still cautions against emphasizing antiSemitism, though it plays a more decisive role in this study in establishing
the dictatorship. The Nazis did not establish control through political
campaigning. They won a plurality in 1932, not a majority, and that
plurality seemed to be shrinking as 1932 ended. The first 100 days,
from January 30 to May 9, 1933, saw the Nazis turn that plurality into
a dictatorship in which, Fritzsche argues, most Germans felt the Nazis
were better able to satisfy their desire for national unity, political peace,
and an end to crisis.
The “trilogy” also traces the evolution of historiographical trends
from the 1980s to the present. Rehearsals was part of a wave of regional
studies at the time and spoke the sociological language of class and
electoral analysis. Hitler’s First Hundred Days, while focused on Berlin,
moves around Germany more expansively and is more attentive to
mythmaking and culture.
Fritzsche offers explanatory concepts that require readers to
sometimes grapple with paradox. He describes the attitude of many
Germans to the events of the 100 days as “no, yes,” a contradiction that
effectively demonstrates the combination of reservation and enthusiasm
Fritzsche found in diaries, memoirs, jokes, and other everyday materials
of the period: no to the violence in the streets, yes to the destruction of
the Communist Party; no to the uneducated thugs of the NSDAP, yes
to national unity; no to 1918, yes to 1914 (95, 120).
That last juxtaposition is important to Fritzsche’s argument in its own
right. Part of the Nazis’s success can be explained by their being on the
correct side of the mythmaking around both dates. For many Germans
1918 stood for defeat, the November Revolution, and—though signed
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in 1919—the Treaty of Versailles. Many nationalists, and not just the
Nazis, saw that defeat as the unjust result of a “stab in the back” by Jews,
socialists, and other shadowy groups who waged the revolution and
established the Republic. For many Germans, and not just nationalists,
1914 represented the Burg frieden, the period of national unity when all
parties of the Kaiser’s Reichstag supported the credits necessary to fight
the war. The Nazis promised to take Germany back in time from 1918
and crisis to 1914 and unity.
Between January 30 and May 9, the Nazis exploited opportunities
and staged events to accomplish that time travel. The Reichstag fire,
the March elections and the preceding Day of the Awakening Nation,
the Day of Potsdam, the boycott of Jewish businesses, the Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, the Day of National Labor,
and the book burning—technically day 101—demonstrated the sense
of unity and the need to act in a state of crisis sometimes created
by the Nazis and led Germans to accept “normality” as defined
by the NSDAP (266).
Terror, murder, and arrest cowed the enemies of the NSDAP,
but Fritzsche is also attentive to the role new technologies and simple
administration played in helping the Nazis secure control. Radio played
an especially important role in carrying Hitler’s message—and only
Hitler’s message—to the nation as a whole, but so did paperwork.
Forms necessary to prove one’s “Aryan” ancestry and to keep one’s
job taught Germans (who did not already know it) the language of
Nazi anti-Semitism—of insiders and outsiders—that became a part of
everyday life.
Though Fritzsche makes an argument about Germany as a whole
and does include evidence from Hanover, Lower Saxony, East Prussia,
and other regions, the book’s center of gravity is Berlin, and Fritzsche’s
affection for Berlin is palpable. The city at first seems a strange place to
locate a study of Germany’s embrace of the Third Reich. “Red Berlin,”
with its large, organized, Marxist working class, should have been the
place where the Nazis struggled most to find support. Electoral analyses
show the NSDAP received lower percentages of votes in cities than in
small towns and lower percentages from the working class than from
the middle class.
Of course, Berlin is the capital of Germany, and many of the events
in Hitler’s First Hundred Days happen in and around the city. Choosing
Berlin gives Fritzsche a physical landscape upon which to tell his story.
Readers get to know the streets and neighborhoods through which the
Nazis marched, in which they fought their battles with the socialists
and communists. And the fact that the process Fritzsche describes
takes place in “Red Berlin” as well as in Northeim—the location of
W. S. Allen’s path-breaking The Nazi Seizure of Power, which shares many
of this book’s strengths—makes his argument even more convincing.
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Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History
Edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber
Reviewed by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, senior historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

T

he TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation included an episode
titled “Darmok,” where the crew encountered a civilization that
communicates only in phrases that refer to events that are so ingrained
in the culture they have become metaphors. Such is the same with Pearl
Harbor for Americans. Yet that cultural metaphor lies uneasily next to
another belief entrenched into the national psyche: the United States is
not an imperialist nation, unlike the Japanese empire that had launched
the vicious surprise attack. With this common narrative in mind, Beth
Bailey and David Farber have curated a collection of 10 fine essays that
examine the attack on Pearl Harbor from different viewpoints but all
through the lens of imperialism. The essays broaden and deepen the
narrative of a well-known topic in a relatively short work that melds
military and social history and gives voice to British, Australian, Chinese,
Japanese, and insular American sources by examining the attack from the
other-than-common American viewpoint.
In the first essay, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor . . . and Guam,
Wake Island, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong
Kong,” Bailey and Farber set the stage for the examination to follow
(1). Their review of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy”
speech is an insightful look at the art of strategic communications by
a master communicator. Their description of the differences between
Hawaii and the other American territories helps explain the legal basis
for the difference in approach to the attacks on them.
This essay provides a seamless transition to Daniel Immerwahr’s
“‘American Lives’: Pearl Harbor and the War in the US Empire” (39).
He examines what it meant to be an American and how the United
States assessed its overseas possessions unevenly. In one memorable
phrase, he claims that “Roosevelt, in other words, was making a
calculation. He was rounding the Philippines down to foreign and
rounding Hawaii up to American” (41, italics in original). In a phrase
that carries even more resonance today, he argues that “War is a time of
danger and sacrifice, a time when risks are apportioned. Who bore those
risks had a lot to do with who got recognized as ‘American.’ It was a
question of who was in and who was out—of whose lives mattered”(43).
Immerwahr concludes by describing the liberation of American overseas
territories in the Aleutians, Guam, and the Philippines by soldiers who
were unaware the civilian population being liberated was also American.
Christopher Cappozola in his essay argues that the “politics of
anticipation” for the Japanese attack in the Philippines drove a series
of authoritarian regimes. These regimes used the potential for an
attack to consolidate power and attract money from the United States
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(158–68). This argument is less convincing with regard to post-war,
post-independence authoritarian regimes.
Twin essays by Jeremy Yellen and Samuel Hideo Yamashita examine
Japanese attitudes toward the attack, including public and private
responses and how the mood was reflected in the popular press. They
note some skeptics, but the attitude among the Japanese people was
nearly uniformly positive. In another chapter, Yujin Yaguchi argues
the Japanese media, since the war, has refashioned the narrative, so
Pearl Harbor becomes the first step toward rapprochement and the
eventual alliance of commercial superpowers, rather than a clash
between empires.
Rana Mitter and Nicole Elizabeth Barnes examine the Chinese
perspective on the attack that elevated Chinese prospects in numerous
ways. Mitter argues the attack caused political and military leaders to
think differently about the nation’s identity. “Those changes heralded
the initial moves that would propel China into a new position in the
postwar world” (103). China’s alliance with the Western allies gave it an
advantage over the Japanese with whom it had been at war since 1937.
The attack, however, also exposed the ongoing rift between Chinese
nationalists and Chinese communists that led to civil war shortly after
World War II ended.
Barnes provides a fascinating examination of the development
of Chinese medical care during the war. The entry of the United States
into the war in the Pacific pulled occupying Japanese forces away from
China, which eventually stopped the air raids that were decimating
the Chinese population. Chinese medical facilities were then able to
shift their focus from combat-related injuries to pre- and post-natal
care and preventive care, which increased the overall health of the
Chinese population.
The attack also changed China’s network of support, in which the
United States and the United Kingdom became its primary benefactors,
replacing other nations in the Asian rim. Kate Darian-Smith in “Pearl
Harbor and Australia’s War in the Pacific” notes that Pearl Harbor, the
fall of Singapore, and the subsequent bombing of Darwin (known as
Australia’s Pearl Harbor) signaled a shift in Pacific Rim alliances—with
Australia becoming more closely aligned with the United States.
Pearl Harbor, as a simple metaphor for a singular American event,
has obscured the different views of the attack from around the Pacific
Rim. As American defense interests in the Pacific grow daily, strategic
leaders would profit from a fresh look at a familiar subject. Most
histories focus on the attack itself and the diplomatic and intelligence
events leading to it.
The phrase “America Empire” falls hard on American ears; the
revolt of the 13 colonies against the British Empire is deeply embedded
in the nation’s cultural memory. The irony of vehemently deriding the
evils of empires while simultaneously maintaining overseas possessions
in Hawaii, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines was lost on
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most Americans. Yet the views of residents living in these American
territories as well as the views of their Pacific neighbors are important
to our understanding of the strategic effects of the attack. Beyond Pearl
Harbor provides a deeper, broader, and more strategic view of what has
traditionally been assumed to be a purely American event.

The World at War, 1914–1945
By Jeremy Black
Reviewed by Dr. Michael S. Neiberg, chair of war studies, US Army War College

T

he frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful process of making peace
in 1919 caused many contemporary observers to predict the war of
1914–18 would mark the first round of a much-longer conflict. Some
of these famous observations have questionable provenance and may
well be apocryphal, but two that can be easily corroborated are worth
mentioning here.
The British journalist Charles à Court Repington was pessimistic—
maybe prescient is a better word—enough to use the phrase “First World
War” in his diary as early as September 1918. He also used it as the title
of a one-volume history of the war he published highlighting his fear of
a second world war breaking out as soon as the great powers could rearm
and recover (The First World War [London: Constable, 1920]).

In a similar vein, American General Tasker H. Bliss wrote to
his wife in April 1919. He shared his worry that “The wars are not
yet over. I don’t like the treaty and it seems to me that it means another
30 years’ war, winding up with about the same grouping of states as
before” (Tasker H. Bliss, “Letter to Nellie Bliss” in Bliss Papers, April
1919, US Army Heritage and Education Center).
In the years immediately following 1945, the historiographical and
popular trend separated the two World Wars. In the West, this division
helped to underscore the seemingly undeniable and overwhelming
Western triumph in the Second World War in contrast to the muddy,
ambivalent semivictory of the first. The Holocaust, the atomic bomb,
and the sheer scale of war from 1939 to 1945 provided more reasons
to separate the two conflicts. In the United States, one needs to go no
further to prove this point than to see the contrast between the massive
World War II Memorial on the National Mall and the small memorial to
the men of Washington, DC, that is the only remembrance of the First
World War on America’s most sacred ground of national memory.
Jeremy Black’s latest book, The World at War, 1914–1945, engages
with recent formulations that treat the two World Wars as part of
one unified historical dynamic. This so-called long war thesis sees
the period 1914–45—sometimes continuing to the end of the Cold
War in 1991—much as Repington and Bliss saw it. In a narrative and
essentially chronological treatment, Black wrestles with the strengths

New York: Rowan and
Littlefield, 2019
349 pages
$98.00

160

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

and weaknesses of the long war concept. While acknowledging it has
grown in popularity in recent years, Black ultimately rejects the long war
concept as too Eurocentric.
Black primarily employs a comparative methodology. He is less
concerned with constructing a narrative arc from 1914 to 1945 than
in engaging in a juxtaposition of patterns between the war of 1914–18
and the war of 1939–45. This method provides for a direct comparison
and contrast of the two wars, but the jumping around, sometimes even
within the same paragraph, might confuse readers less familiar with
some of the book’s details.
More helpfully, Black sees the World Wars as part of a much-wider
periodization. He places the European wars within the wider context of
the end of empires, beginning with the 1898 Spanish-American War. The
1914–18 war ended four major terrestrial empires—namely, the AustroHungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian empires—replacing them
with the nation-states that dominate Europe and the Middle East today.
The Second World War fatally undermined the overseas empires of both
the vanquished and, more significantly, the nominal victors of France
and Britain.
Such an analysis, Black argues, has the advantage of decentering
the “German question” from the wars. This is not to say Black finds
Germany irrelevant; it occupies more of the book than any other country.
Rather, he argues readers may miss wider patterns not as easy to discern
by focusing too much on Germany.
Black’s central argument against the long war thesis centers on
events in Asia. The crucial dynamic there, he contends, begins with the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95—or even as far back as the First Opium
War of 1839–42. The result was the rise to power of China and the
United States as the two most dominant states in the region, an outcome
few would have dared to predict at the turn of the twentieth century.
The strength of the book lies in its challenge to see the period 1914–45
in ways different from how scholars and popular culture normally
present it.
A Canadian memorial to the Montreal Fusiliers at Dieppe, France,
to commemorate the 1942 disaster there begins its list of the regiment’s
campaigns not with Dieppe itself but with the Second Battle of
Ypres in 1915. Whether or not the men of 1942 understood themselves
as finishing the work of their fathers in 1915 may, as The World at War,
1914–1945 challenges us to consider, be the wrong question to ask.
Instead readers might ask whether they understood the irony that their
imperial service represented, in the wider scheme of history, a critical
element in bringing about the end of empires.
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The Red Army and the Second World War
By Alexander Hill
Reviewed by Dr. Reina Pennington, Charles A. Dana Professor of History,
Norwich University

T

his fascinating study of the Red Army adds new dimensions to
the understanding of Soviet military success in the Great Patriotic
War. Although part of the Cambridge University Press Armies of the
Second World War series, this book is not an overview of events on the
Eastern Front or another history of the war. Readers are expected to
have studied at least one of the key histories by John Erickson, David
Glantz and Jonathan House, Evan Mawdsley, or Chris Bellamy. Hill
identifies the key factors contributing to Soviet military effectiveness,
shows how the problem of Soviet reach frequently exceeded its
grasp, and makes a convincing case for the ongoing qualitative
improvement which “transformed [the Red Army] into a more effective
fighting force” (3).
The book can be broken down into thirds: about 200 pages each
devoted to the prewar period, to 1941–42, and to 1943–45. Hill’s intense
evaluation of the effects of prewar experiences and how they shaped the
Red Army facing the Germans in 1941 is a strength of the book. The
chapters on Khalkhin Gol and Finland are particularly interesting. Few
general histories highlight this context so essential for understanding
Soviet choices, strengths, and weaknesses going into the war. Hill also
provides a clear view of the constantly changing conditions of the war:
1944 was a whole different ball game than 1941, and the differences are
detailed in the “The Ten ‘Stalinist’ Blows of 1944” and other chapters.
Hill uses a wide variety of Russian language sources and draws upon
primary accounts in the post-Soviet era as well as scholarly studies. Many
personal stories add human interest and on-the-ground realism to the
issues illustrated. Another great strength of Hill is his use of archival and
documentary sources: his 2009 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,
1941–45: A Documentary Reader is a good companion volume.
Hill provides thought-provoking analysis of the role of cavalry in
the war, communications, rear support services, the development of
reconnaissance and deception techniques, and the process by which
Soviet military leaders carefully sought lessons learned and attempted to
translate these lessons learned into a more-effective military effort. He
stresses Stalin’s role in escalating the price paid in lives and resources.
To ensure Germany’s defeat, Stalin drove his commanders to conduct
offensives without adequate preparation or resources. Even so, the Red
Army grew better over time. The army reduced its loss ratios, and its
soldiers fought stubbornly and with increasing skill. The Red Army often
had quantitative advantages, and Hill details these advantages while also
analyzing the qualitative improvements vital to military success.
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The detailed conclusion sums up Hill’s key arguments, emphasizing
by the end of the war, both Soviet weapons and the Red Army as a whole
were “well-conceived but not overly complex” and “relatively simple,
robust and at the same time effective” (566). The Red Army did not solve
all its problems, but played to its strengths and demonstrated a resilience
which produced one of the most dramatic instances of strategic reversal
in military history. Hill also offers a very useful comparison of British
and Soviet experiences, pointing out “many issues noted here for the
Red Army were not peculiarly Soviet” (572). Ultimately, “By the end of
the Great Patriotic War the Red Army was certainly in many ways a very
different creature than it had been” before—an army that had become
more efficient and more effective (562).
The accessibility of the book could be improved. The chapters
average 20 to 30 pages with no subheadings even though most chapters
focus on two or three main topics. Paragraphs sometimes extend for
two or more pages, and the text is often packed with lists of units and
numbers of weapons, personnel, and casualties which would be easier
to understand in chart form. There are no charts, and maps are few and
overly basic. The publisher could have upgraded these aspects of the
book. The illustrations, glossary, bibliography, and index, however, are
nicely done, and the paper quality holds up to highlighting and notetaking, always a plus.
The story of the Eastern Front from 1939–45 is almost
overwhelming—on a scale as to be almost incomprehensible. Hill’s
new source-based and in-depth analysis of important and sometimes
neglected aspects of Red Army successes and failures successfully drills
down and adds several more layers to the comprehension of the role
of the Red Army in the Second World War. The Red Army and the Second
World War is a must-have addition to the library of serious students of
the Eastern Front.

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire
By A. Wess Mitchell
Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, research historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

T
Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2018
403 pages
$27.95

he Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire examines the strategic
statecraft of the Habsburg Empire, Austria, as a standalone security
actor—from the end of the Spanish dynastic connection by 1700 and
before the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary from 1867. Author
A. Wess Mitchell is not an academic historian, but a State Department
security professional. The preface and first chapter make four main
claims for Habsburg strategy, with the three central themes of secure
buffers, an army in being combined with frontier fortresses, and allied
coalitions. Austria’s preeminent challenge was “interstitial,” i.e. response
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to threats in time and space, so as to avoid simultaneous wars on
multiple fronts (ix).
Part I concerns strategic constraints. A central position demanded a
careful accounting of geography’s diplomatic and military implications,
hence Austria’s investment in comprehensive mapping. No surprise,
the demographic, ethnic complexity of the empire affected domestic
political power, economics, and future territorial acquisition. Mitchell
categorizes Austria as never “a normal Great Power” with its
“complicated constitutional order” and “contested nature” of “domestic
power” (79–80). Preservation of the army was central to survival of the
dynasty and state.
Institutions evolved to deal with threats, variously France, Turkey,
Russia, and Prussia. Increasingly sophisticated structures maximized
peacetime planning and reduced wartime reaction. They incorporated
Byzantine and Renaissance elements and just war traditions. Mitchell
assesses these as Austrian equivalents of the US Quadrennial Defense
Review and National Security Strateg y.
Part II covers the “Habsburg Frontier ‘Defense Systems’” in three
eras (119). The 1690s to the 1730s witnessed a rare Austrian emphasis on
the military and the mobile field armies that launched counteroffensives
against the Turks after the final, failed Turkish Siege of Vienna in 1683.
Military efficacy rested upon Eugene of Savoy as commander of forces
with organizational and technical superiority over the Ottoman Turks.
The 1740s to the 1750s marked a more sustained threat against the
state. The War of Austrian Succession in 1740–48 challenged Queen
Maria Theresa’s right to rule. There was no commander of Eugene’s
talent, and the army could not match the tactical articulation of the
Prussians. Next was the Seven Years War from 1756–63. Now Wenzel
Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg, premier diplomat for four decades, worked
Prussia’s diplomatic isolation, except for Britain, a daunting paymaster,
but no land power. Maria Theresa had led and encouraged major army
and other governmental reforms. A far superior army emerged, but
Frederick’s operational finesse within interior lines, and luck, saved
Prussia. Perhaps diverging if not conflicting allied war aims played
the greater role. Two concurrent Silesian Wars showcased Austrian
determination to recover Silesia and humble Prussia. Throughout
Austrian leaders kept the southeastern front facing the Turks quiet via
appeasement and military borders.
The 1770s to the 1790s reconfirmed a preventive strategy. Austria
both checked Russian ambitions and courted Russian assistance.
Napoleonic France, 1804–14, was the toughest of Austria’s foes, as
Napoleon exploited the methodological seams in traditional Austrian
strategic security systems. French armies were also bigger and better.
Archduke Charles Louis John Joseph Laurentius, Duke of Teschen, did
become the closest combination of both reformer and talented general.
Of greater note were Klemens von Metternich’s efforts to turn the tide.
He played for time, returned to war in 1809, and triumphed by 1814 with
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Napoleon’s abdication. After allied victory over Napoleon’s Campaign
of the Hundred Days in 1815, Metternich incorporated a defeated France
into a European Concert to guard a new balance of power.
Part III covers 1815–66, with Austria clearly a second-rate power.
Mitchell views Metternich’s work as largely successful from 1815–48,
especially the sequential suppression of the Revolutions of 1848 with
Russian assistance. Two other aspects merit emphasis.
First, conditions now greatly compromised traditional systems,
especially the ability to orchestrate sequencing and duration. Austria
thus looked beyond immediate borders. A new Deutscher Bund of 39
Germanic states replaced the 300-odd states in the eighteenth century.
Mitchell compares the relationship to 39 distinct status of forces
agreements. An Italian League linked Austria’s possessions there,
though Mitchell sees the area as Austria’s Achilles’ heel.
Second, and Mitchell is most emphatic on this point, Austria’s
defeats in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866 were not inevitable. He believes Austrian leaders erred
grievously by overestimating the viability of the military instrument as
a primary policy tool. First, the military wielded greater influence in
the state. Second, the army became anti-intellectual and enamored with
an offensive doctrine tactically and operationally. While fiscal realities
likely impacted events, the military leaders devoted too little effort to
force modernization.
Strategic inflexibility replaced sophisticated diplomacy, beginning
with resort to the bellicose armed neutrality against Russia when pitted
against a coalition in the Crimean War of 1853–56. Future Russian
enmity was virtually assured. Worse, Austria at war turned to strategic
offensives which ill-suited Austrian capability and capacity, and which
went against traditional security approaches. Austrian strategy for
decades used strategic defensives to buy time, in part for allies to rally.
The early losses at Solferino in 1859 and Sadowa (Königgrätz) in 1866
were fast and decisive with Austria alone. Austria had played to enemy
strengths. Incidentally, in 1859 the French had accomplished no less
than a swift strategic force projection using steamships and railroads.
In 1866 Prussia executed national will on its time table. Mitchell shows
how these scenarios warranted more traditional strategic approaches but
Austrian leaders rejected them.
Chapter 10 on the Habsburg legacy underlines the Austrian view of
hard power as secondary. The army was not an instrument of annihilation.
The diplomatic element showcased the Austrian state as a category apart
with “necessity status” as Austria represented a nonthreatening quest for
order (309). Austria’s alliances showcased its willingness to help smaller,
weaker partners deter rising hegemons.
Finally, in the epilogue Mitchell articulates 13 broad principles of
Habsburg strategic statecraft to inform today’s challenges that merit
particular attention. Comparative analysis remains a double-edged
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sword, but will raise elementary questions about America’s role in the
world and who constitutes threats and why.
The Grand Strateg y of the Habsburg Empire is not light reading—329
pages of text and 45 pages of endnotes—but Mitchell has balanced a
modest look at primary sources with an examination of a very wide
selection of secondary literature. While the discussion is exhaustive, the
result is a sweeping case study in ends, ways, and means.

Pax Romana: War, Peace, and Conquest in the Roman World
By Adrian Goldsworthy
Reviewed by Dr. Jason W. Warren, defense contractor supporting information
and cyber defense and security policy

I

n 51 BC, Julius Caesar, commander and political czar of Roman efforts
in Gaul, ordered the hands of captured Gallic insurgents lopped off
as a means to dispirit any hope of further resistance (410). As historian
Adrian Goldsworthy demonstrates in Pax Romana, this atrocity and others
like it were part of Rome’s method for gaining empire. Usually these
violent and heavy-handed approaches occurred early in the pacification
of conquered peoples and not throughout the duration of occupation.
Rome opted for a mixture of cooperation for mutual benefit, threats,
and occasional violence, such as Caesar’s, to establish a lasting peace still
noteworthy for its longevity to this day.
In this expansive and accessible account Goldsworthy, in his
politesse British style, implicitly pushes back on the prevailing
argument that empire is a negative, especially for conquered peoples.
His refreshing argument shows how, after an initial period of resistance
and submission, almost all subdued tribes accepted empire and the
benefits of Roman rule, indeed often citizenship. The advantages were
many, including improved administration, a disruption of brigandage,
the absence of internecine warfare, and above all, the status of being
a friend of powerful Rome. This reviewer is reminded of the accurate
Monty Python comedy sketch from The Life of Brian, “What Have the
Romans Ever Done for Us?” where the long list of improvements on
Roman-Britain is then listed, with the retort of the would-be insurgents,
“well besides that.” The legion was therefore used sparingly, and stood
sentinel on the borders of barbarism, far from the core of empire.
Goldsworthy goes to great lengths to maintain a balanced telling of
events, refusing to gloss over occasional brutal imperial management.
This balance obviates potential scholarly criticism about the upheavals
and loss of freedom that subject peoples experienced. On the whole,
he determines empire was best for the vast majority of individuals who
came within its bounds.
Rome also chose monarchy and empire, as was the case when the
Roman Senate only briefly debated a return to empire after Caligula’s
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assassination in 41 AD (179). In an implicit comparison to other
empires, Rome also chose to limit the boundaries of its empire, with
a few notable exceptions such as Dacia and Mesopotamia, following
Augustus’s advice to his stepson Tiberius after the defeat of the legions
in the Teutoburg Forest (174–75).
As was the case with his stellar How Rome Fell, Goldsworthy brings
to life how individual agency shaped the course of the Pax. Rome
successfully harnessed the ambition of talented leaders who amalgamated
tribes and territory as much for personal gain as for the glory of Rome.
This method of empire building existed whether during the Republican
empire, the civil wars, or through the general peace, until the upheaval
of the third century AD.
Unfortunately, Goldsworthy forgoes the opportunity to delve
deeper into issues of human nature, as to why such peace is so rare,
something he connects with his growing up during the relative
quietude in the United Kingdom after the Second World War
(preface). Goldsworthy labors to identify the unique nature of such
a long peace, but fails to expand on this thesis—is man’s nature
therefore one of Hobbesian violence and hence contrary to the
widespread belief in the West that peace is the natural state of being?
Such useful examinations are absent, as with Goldsworthy’s obvious
failure to juxtapose American republican empire since at least 1919,
and all of its attendant consequences for world history and peace.
Where Goldsworthy sees such connections with the past as problematic,
such an approach undermines the gaining of historical insights better
to contextualize foreign policy decisions today (7–8). Just as the Pax
Romana was noteworthy, so is this account for scholars and students
alike, albeit coming up slightly short in this regard.

